## Can the Utopia of Strangers Be a City?: A Radical (Re-)Reading

# of Struggle and Utopia at the End Times of Philosophy

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Abstract: In the troubled and very uncertain times that we experience [connaissons], there is a great temptation to want to (re-)construct a secure space, imagining new forms of human existence that carry hope... What is more natural? As such, the reflections can be led towards the city as an ancestral crucible for our inter-human relations and exchanges which occupies a prominent place. What is the city for tomorrow? is a major theme that occupies, or at least preoccupies, our contemporaries worldwide. And as non-philosophers, surely, we are tempted by adventure. It is also the question of what non-philosophy can do in this context that is ineluctably posed. But the pitfalls of the Thought-World, if this is not philosophy, appear just as ineluctably and inevitably, ready to (ac)cept [(ac)cueillir] us in our wanderings. Thus, notably, the very term of the aty employed by François Laruelle himself several times in his writings, which could seem to legitimate its use in this approach in view of carrying out a concrete reflection of this order, must be analyzed more profoundly and precisely. What impact can non-philosophy have concretely upon the World? As nonphilosophers, must we totally resolve ourselves to a non-acting indifferent to worldly motion and therefore to a sealed fate of present and future humans? What is a utopia that comes unilaterally into the World and does not rock back and forth in mirages and the belief in an efficiency and worldly materialization?

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**Keywords:** non-philosophy, vision-in-One, Being, order, the Real, polis, city, utopia, the political, thought-world

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n Struggle and Utopia at the End Times of Philosophy (2004), François Laruelle notably applied himself to "caution non-philosophers against the temptation of returning and looking backwards towards philosophy."1 Non-philosophy is in effect "always threatened by a return to theoreticism"<sup>2</sup> specified later on, for there are multiple ways of returning to philosophy, above all to thes Thought-World, which claims to be able to think everything, to encompass it, but not be reduced to it; the slippage can be surreptitious, imperceptible, and delicate. Hence, one of the essential problems for a non-philosopher: rigor. To be non-philosophically rigorous implies demonstrating a great vigilance in order not to fall back into the mesh of the Thought-World, which, like a bewitching siren, persistently sings in our minds. We need to cultivate Odysseus' solid determination not to yield, above all in the troubled times that we experience, where the Human crumbles under the mountains of contradictory information, where worldly representations are confronted with violence, where mass manipulation is more than ever the norm; where, thereby, projections become more the

spontaneous and therefore where our vigilance diminishes, even fades away. When the future becomes more than uncertain and announced by major changes, when an eschatological lexical field fills up a secured space, imagining new forms of human existence bears hope...What is more natural? As such, the reflections could be led towards the city as an ancestral crucible for our inter-human relations and exchanges which occupies a prominent place. One of the major themes that occupies, or at least preoccupies, our contemporaries worldwide, is What is the city for tomorrow? As non-philosophers, surely we are tempted by adventure. The question of what non-philosophy can do is posed ineluctably as well, but just as ineluctably and inevitably, the pitfalls of the Thought-World, if this is not philosophy, appears ready to (ac)cept<sup>3</sup> us in our wanderings. Please note that by once more accepting being thrown in the Cave, the non-philosopher must be aware to not get lost, to not let themselves be (re)abused by the cast shadows, and above all to not forget why they accepted to be thrown: "in order to trouble the good conscience of the World with heresy,"4 and in our process to be aware of the

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>1</sup> François Laruelle, Struggle and Utopia at the End Times of Philosophy, trans. Drew S. Burk and Anthony Paul Smith (Minneapolis: Univocal, 2012), 25; François Laruelle, La lutte et l'utopie à la fin des temps philosophiques (Paris: Kimé, 2004), 26.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>2</sup> Laruelle, *Struggle and Utopia*, 137; 117. [Any citations to existing English translations of Laruelle's writings will precede their French originals. – Trans.]

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>3</sup> The English word "accept" etymologically is related to "capture" (*ad* + *capere*), which is a major theme throughout this work. In lack of a proper way of translating (*au)ceniller*, (ac)cept may assist the reader in understanding that there is a seizure that is welcoming yet received willingly. – Trans.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>4</sup> Laruelle, Struggle and Utopia, 165; 138-40.

employed terms, for the *Logos* keeps its watch, like the Minotaur, the labyrinth guardian, who will not fail to seize us at the slightest imprudent distraction. Thus, notably, the very term the city, employed by Laruelle himself several times in this work and in other writings, which could seem to legitimate its use in this approach in view of carrying out a concrete reflection of this order, must be analyzed more profoundly and precisely.

The investigation into the conditions of possibility of a living-together that is not determined by the Thought-World actually happens with a reflection on the notion of the city. This term, which comes from the Greek polis and the Latin civitas, refers to a much more ancestral reality. Since the Bronze Age and even, to some archeologists, the Neolithic Era, structures that are relevant to this concept already existed; these ensembles are characterized by a regrouping of individuals under common rules and institutions, physically recognizable by a precise spatial delimitation. In effect, the principle and elaboration of the city are first motivated by the will to distinguish those who live in the acceptance of the rules laid out—hence the term civilized—and the others, the barbarians, who, by way of consequence, emerge from an inferior level of humanity, and are de facto banished, i.e., exiled *outside*. The physical delimitation of territory consists in an enclosed wall or a moat,

which is a symbol that is as much one of protection as division, which reflects since the beginning the fear of the other, the fear of the potential unknown. The idea is already embodied, beyond differences, in constituting a social body, as clearly delimited and harmoniously organized as a human, physical body. In this context, it is grounded in a ritualized way in view of giving it a sacred character. Another motivation emerges from another type of protection: the point is to get out of the economic precarity that belonged to the village, even the sedentarized one, by first organizing the long-term engagement of harvests in order to escape from famines, then by the surpluses of the production and division of labor, a persistent accumulation of wealth that assures the viability and global security of the structure and, therefore, its inhabitants. The Greek polis inscribed itself in this same vein, by even further emphasizing it on the common project of a living-together, this social body that reflects the collective consciousness of the Greeks and their representation of the World: the polis as an independent and sovereign community over the citizens that compose it, cemented by cults, and ruled by the laws, is entirely emblematic and symptomatic of the Greek aspiration towards the cosmos and its repulsion of chaos. It is thus very concretely representative of a will towards the control of the real in view of a philosophically proclaimed perfection, notably by Plato

and Aristotle. The latter sees in the city both a fact of nature and the most perfect form of social organization insofar as it realizes the essence of man as a political animal. Beyond the fact of assuring the defense and satisfaction of the needs of its members, the city allows men to grant themselves to an ideal of justice by making the choice of living, and above all living well, in friendship, by cultivating virtue; thus, the city is the conditio sine qua non of a fully human, common, and perfect life. 5 In Aristotle, ethics and politics are thus inseparable, and it is because man assigns an organizational function with an ethical vocation to the *polis* that it exits from its strictly animal condition. Therefore, the *polis* constitutes an ensemble of three levels of distinct realities: a spatial given, consistent within a physical entity tying a town to its territory and an ecosystem; a strongly structured community of free and autonomous entitled peoples [ayant-droits], both a political entity and the framework of the emergence of the political, characterized by the domination of speech and the publicity of debates; and finally, a sovereign State, endowed with kingly powers that plays a role on the international scene. Hannah Arendt, in her analysis of the Greek polis, emphasizes the space of appearance par excellence

that it constitutes, "a place in which the actors make themselves *comprehensible* to one another by meeting and interacting with one another." Thereby, everything that is presented in this place by one of these actors becomes real in the life of others, and, consequently, to be deprived or excluded from participating in this space or being threatened to be deprived of it comes back to a (threat of the) privation of reality: the meaning of the reality of the world being uniquely defined and guaranteed by the rules of the public appearance of this entity and the play of the actors within its breast.

Thus, the *polis*, as much in its conception as in its organization, is intrinsically bound to the Thought-World understood as the Pretension and Decision on the Real, subordinated to a *Telos* of order, mastery and efficacy. And this is because of the fear that undeniably presides within this whole construction, and more precisely a double fear. The first fear, which is ancestral, is bound to the survival of the species: the fear of the loss of life for lack of the essential means of subsistence, but also for lack of sufficient protection against any *other*; the shelter, in the broad sense of the term, motivates the elaboration and construction of any city.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>5</sup> Aristotle, *Politics*, Book I, Chapter II, 1242-1254; Book III, Chapter IX, 1280b29-35.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>6</sup> Hannah Arendt, *Condition de l'homme modern*, traducteur Georges Fradier (Paris: Calmann-Lévy, 2000), 253-57. [The closest our translation from the French comes is in Hannah Arendt, *The Human Condition* (Chicago:

The University of Chicago Press, 1958), 198: "The *polis* ... is the organization of the people as it arises out of acting and speaking together, and its true space lies between people living together for this purpose, no matter where they happen to be." –Trans.]

The second fear emerges from the fear of the loss of meaning; the city procures a structuring and signifying framework endowed with effective symbolic landmarks as much as a clear direction. Therefore, the city is in many ways reassuring. How does one behave well to not risk the demise of humanity: such could be thus the problematic summed up—even unconsciously and implicitly—in the elaboration of the city. We inscribe our fears and consequently our desires in matter. Thus, the city appears as soon as the conjunction—between the absolute necessity of survival and the utility that the organization represents in this regard, understood as the Donation of a spatio-temporal framework towards human activity, with an origin uniquely dedicated to this survival—is established in the minds of human beings. And any thought seeking to explain the world, seeking to trace the paths of its becoming, guiding and ruling individuals in the acts of their everyday life, ends by creating the governmental institutions that guarantee the stability of this codification of the relations of the human with their environment. These institutions have been or are still religious and economic; they are in any case political, whatever form or domination that they can occasionally adopt. Religion has structured social life where the State did not yet exist. The

imaginary representation was employed for the imperative of political utility in the broad sense with the prescription of obedience as an unavoidable kernel. Order is imposed from itself, so to speak: the passage from holist or traditional religions to religions of the subject accompanies, indeed induces, the constitution of a declared democratic space grounded upon autonomous individuals. From this perspective, religion greatly anticipates philosophy. One can ask why, at one given moment and geographical place, the human passes from one certain type of religion to another, or from religion to philosophy—indeed, the inverse. We can formulate the hypothesis of a movement of spirit that, at one given moment, tends to disengage itself from the framework to invent more supple, less alienating structures of organization that are more conforming to this movement. But if the fear remains, it ends by recapturing it, for in one violent pendulum movement, it reduces itself to another framework, more proper to sooth its fears. Perhaps this is what Friedrich Nietzsche attempted to tell us, when he evoked the exigency of suppressing the motivation of fear, writing: "we wish that there will one day no longer be anything to fear."<sup>7</sup>

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>7</sup> Friedrich Nietzsche, *Beyond Good and Evil: Prelude to a Philosophy of the Future*, trans. R.J. Hollingdale (London: Penguin Books, 1973), §201, 124. – Trans.

This is how the Logos, via our representations, structures life in society as the whole of our relationship to the World: its rational-logical argumentation by its decision-making mechanisms stemming from its will to mastery, takes whole parts of reality to rearrange them in its own way in order to establish a coherence starting from its own priorities. The structure of language is such that the attachment of any object of discourse to a previously known referent is inevitable; the function of identification is to classify and order things and the signs that designate them. Language models reality in order to make a sensible World where humans can find their bearings; it marks out, traces, cuts, makes leaps, breaks, imposes artificial limits, where nature, as Leibniz underlined, proceeds only by imperceptible changes, gradual transitions, and progressive transformations. Plato philosophically grounds the *polis* by taking over the notion of separation, of religious essence the sacer, the sacred, is the separate, forbidden, inviolable domain. It constitutes the bridgehead of the eternal in the temporal. For Gilles Deleuze, the division of the Platonic City is part of the general framework of the theory of Ideas, whose objective is to sort, to make the difference between being and appearance,

truth and falsehood. In the political domain, it is also a question of carrying out this marshaling, and for that it is necessary to establish the criteria for choosing the pretenders to the government of the City. Otherwise, how can one arbitrate between the doctor, the merchant, the farmer [laboureur] who all claim to bring the essential element to the survival of the city? The answer is mythological: myth constructs the model and suggests the criteria of distinction and then of division. What we see here precisely is the incessant relation to something of the order of the existence of a *Truth* that allows for the foundation, and it is where division originates. The criterion of the true is not only a factor of stability, but also a guarantee of effectiveness; it constitutes a bundle of requirements and values which make it possible to guide the experiment and action. Also the division as a gesture is always by nature a political act, since it allows for the very principle of the government; the division of a group in two, on one side the governors, on the other the governed, and the relation to a Truth is the essential component. From this point of view, the State is not opposed to the *polis*; it is only the expression of the same principle, conceived to operate in a wider more effective way. It is

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>8</sup> Notably in Gilles Deleuze, *Logique du sens* (Paris: Minuit, 1969), et seq. [Gilles Deleuze, "Plato and the

Simulacrum," in *The Logic of Sense*, trans. Mark Lester and Charles Stivale (New York: Columbia University Press, 1990), 253-54. – Trans.]

above all a Topos, a territory of exercise of power, without which this one, let us recall it, cannot ex-ist.

Martin Heidegger highlights this preponderant link between polis and Logos; for him, the essence of the *polis* is determined starting from its relation to the essence of man, and the essence of man is determined starting from the Truth of Being. The humanity of the Greeks is primordially and exclusively determined starting from Being itself, that is to say, from aletheia, and it is for this reason that only they could and precisely had to found the polis, to rule for the gathering and preservation of the aletheia in a site. The polis is thus posited as a privileged Topos of Being, all the less contestable or a place of contestation, since Heidegger also defines it as a place of History: "One translates polis as state ... this does not capture the entire sense. Rather, polis is the name for the site, the Here, within which and as which Dasein is as historical. The polis is the site of history, the Here, in which, out of which, and for which history happens." Heidegger describes the intrinsic links between, on the one hand, a concrete social reality (the polis), and, on the other hand, that which presides over its foundation and continues to operate within it throughout the

centuries, namely, the *Logos* and its philosophical formulation, notably throughout History. This *site* is thus conceived as the place of unity of the common historical world, the place of all possible human community, tending towards perfection. The Heideggerian remarks translate a state of affairs that results from the relationship between the Logos and the Real, finding its concrete expression in philosophical discourses on politics and history. It is as if the *political*, via the *Logos*, came here to anchoring the human in a place where they cannot escape Transcendence or the Thought-World and, therefore, where they are irremediably subjected to.

In addition, the idea of *choice* underlined by Aristotle is not in this context that of a clever philosophical trick. Because the essential aspect of the *Truth of Being* emphasized by Heidegger can be summarized as follows: man is something that needs and must be governed. Such is one of the fundamental presuppositions of philosophy and of the Thought-World. According to this conception, humans, no matter the era, are always *in lack* [of being governed]. Whether the human is defined as a lingual, religious, rational animal, etc., it is a negative coupled with a positive that alone procures their Humanity. The

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>9</sup> Martin Heidegger, *Introduction à la Métaphysique*, traducteur Gilbert Kahn (Paris: Gallimard, 1935), 159 [Martin Heidegger, *Introduction to Metaphysics*, second

edition, trans. Gregory Fried and Richard Polt (New Haven: Yale University Press, 2014), 169-70, translation slightly modified. – Trans.]

human has no intrinsic value, and only exists as such, philosophically considerable, in the Donation of identity, which makes it a fundamentally subjugated subject, regardless of the doctrines that nevertheless proclaim its autonomy. This Donation is the gesture where the origin of all division lies, whatever its mode of declination. If the modern visibility of the Donation of Identity in politics is the State, it already finds its perfect expression in the (Logo)polis, anchoring the Human-subject in a space which is not their own: a territory, a history, a vocation towards the collectivity that they themselves have not defined and chosen, locking them into the bind [carcan] of the subject, leaving no space of being other than the function that has been decisionally assigned to them.

In this context, it is History which speaks the Law, as a reinforcement of the internal structure of the Thought-World and/or vice-versa, with, as its ultimate horizon—along with its inscription within a unitary frame, with an orientation, and a unique destination—absolute heterogeneity. The threat of deprivation to which Arendt makes reference is thus not posterior to the creation of the *polis* but is its anterior. One could even say that it is an intrinsic part of the

conceptual process that presides over something of the order of a city. This is normative, an indispensable norm to construct and sustain the ossature that is no other than the triadic ossaturate of political power, defined by the conjoined action of a Telos, a Chrono-Topos, under the authority of Logos. 10 Its expected result is obedience and subjugation; this is less a need for power in itself than for the Logos as the hinter-World [arrière-Monde] of all power, i.e., philosophical discourse and its very particular relationship to Truth and thus to the Real.

One might think that the imagination of new forms can escape from this normative structure; this would be very naïve. Cornelius Castoriadis was able to show that society was the creation of a human world, which constitutes a common *Weltanschauung*, shared by the members of the same community: "I hold that human history is essentially defined by imaginary creation. Imaginary, in this context, obviously does not mean fictitious, illusory, specular, but the position of new forms and an undetermined but determining position ... These forms, created by each society, make a world in which this society inscribes itself and gives itself a place. It is through them that it

Sophie Lesueur, Non-philosophie du sujet politique: Une généalogie du pouvoir (Paris: L'Harmattan, 2022). Chrono-Topos must be understood as synonymous with historical discourse concerning a given territory. [Provided with the context of the ossification of power

in its saturation with a *Telos*, a *Chrono-Topos*, and the *Logos* in its grasp, the notion of the os-saturate accompanies the ossature or the skeletal foundation of power and the permeation of it within these elements. — Trans.]

constitutes a system of norms, of institutions in the broadest sense of the term, of values, of orientations, of finalities, of collective life as well as of individual life."11 Castoriadis conceives this creation as an anonymous collective work, which contributes to the creation of an instituting power, exercising its domination over all members of society. According to Castoriadis, this power must be considered as a universal of the social-historical, in the sense that no society whatsoever can dispense with the production of such a system of representations, which has the function of symbolically determining the world in which it is embedded. It justifies this factual situation by precisely invoking the precarity of social existence, the threat that constantly weighs on its organization and makes it fragile: interior threat, the threat of individual transgressions, exterior threats, and above all, according to the author, fear of the future, of the unmanageable, of uncertainty, for which decisions must be taken. This comes to corroborate the importance of the place of fear in the design of all entities of the order of the city.

So the city appears like the archetype of the *etho-techno-logos* concentrated in a *Topos*. According to the Laruellian definition, the *etho-techno-*

logos condenses all historical forms of ethics with the conditions of existence and thought, massively regulated by technology. Since the middle of the twentieth century, the sprawling deployment of mega-cities translated into material the development of our oversized egos as subjugated subjects in disregard of nature in the broadest sense of the term—the eco, the Earth-home. It is the archetypal image of the will to super-mastery of the Real by Donation of the Law in view of the exploitation of the living, plants, and animals, including our most Human heart. Being is more and more in a circle with Having, or more precisely, the incessant quest of Having that tries to fill the proclaimed deficiency of that always (dis)qualified, lacking humanity. Moreover, these last twenty years, the technological whole that is encouraged and voted on [plébiscité] makes the once necessary attribution of a Topos optional or even obsolete. Thus emerges the possibility of a city without site, above ground, ultimately virtual, and therefore a possibility of u-topia, because it is everywhere and nowhere at the same time. It is an u-topia whose essential characteristic would be the Laruellian etho-techno-logos, voluntarily increased to its most perfect expression, both transcendent and worldly. It is exactly the opposite of the Uni-verse, because it is

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>11</sup> Cornelius Castoriadis, "La polis grecque et la création de la démocratie," in *Domaines de l'homme. Les carrefours du labyrinthe II* (Paris: Seuil, 1986), 264. [Cornelius

Castoriadis, "The Greek Polis and the Creation of Democracy." In *Graduate Faculty Philosophy Journal* 2.2 (Fall 1983), 79-115. – Trans.]

conceived as eminently inclusive, integrating and therefore encompassing even human corporality, this city's ambition and vocation in its ultimate development is to dominate even the most human heart of Man, its tenor of radical bumanity.<sup>12</sup> By chance, this machinic claim only has a vague idea of the Real, and is convinced that it merges with worldly reality. If the human being is summoned and forced to confuse their essence and actual conditions of existence with a fabric of rules and norms, like a mummy penetrated by its bandages, 13 only its belief in this fable can provide it with its efficiency; really, nothing else. Nevertheless, it must be admitted that the contemporary pressure in the sense of an absolute integration of the norm, of the most intrinsic conformity to the rule, is omnipresent and more and more vital through what Laruelle calls doxic dilution, 14 i.e., the planetary becoming-doxa of the norm: an attempt at perfect subjection through the manipulative insertion of ethical evidence into the furthest regions of the mind and existence.

This deterritorialization of the city to-come, already eminently omni-present of the *etho-techno*-

logos, urges us as non-philosophers to take a closer look at our reference to the city and our use of the terms as a possible field of expression or application of non-philosophy. Great care must be taken, even renounced, to preserve the clarity, scope, and power of non-philosophy as heretical thought. Indeed, this *polit*ical deterritorialization is the counterpart of the radical extraterritoriality (of) the Real as oraxiomatized by non-philosophy, as a necessity but of possibility, 15 a utopia(-)power [force (d')utopie], 16 because it makes the domination of Man impossible, even in the most alienating etho-technological conditions. This non-located space of being is radically inadequate and indeterminable to all thought of mastery and therefore of power. It is impossible to assimilate or to assign to a field, a domain, a cause, let alone a Telos; no longer circling with any Having, it is thus an inalienable, heretical power. The extraterritoriality (of) the Real expresses the unilateral determination—without return or circle, without any possibility of convertibility—of the Logos and all its worldly manifestations by our radical inalienable human Identity, at the same time as the clear Vision of this determination. This

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>12</sup> François Laruelle, Éthique de l'Étranger: Du crime contre l'humanité (Paris: Kimé, 2000), 9.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>13</sup> Laruelle, Éthique de l'Étranger, 150.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>14</sup> Ibid., 145.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>15</sup> Laruelle, Struggle and Utopia, 141; 120.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>16</sup> In contrast to Burk and Smith's translation "force (of) utopia," which follows from the literal translation of *force (de) pensée* as "force (of) thought," we have opted

to translate *force (d')utopie* as "utopia(-)power" to retain the French Marxian term *force de travail* and its English equivalent "labor-power," while bracketing the connecting hyphen between utopia and power. By bracketing the connective hyphen, we wish to highlight typographically the unilateral relation-without-relation. – Trans.

open space is utopical, in that it is everywhere and nowhere, more precisely ubiquitous, In-Presence everywhere and at all times, without spatial dimension. This extraterritoriality also indicates the essence of comm-Unity [comm-Unaute] 17 as a vision-in-One, a condition of possibility, the unilateral determination of any conception of living-together, of fraternity and social harmony, a One-We that is no longer encompassing but radically immanent. It is because of this that it is radically a utopia(-)power, and consequently uchronic. It is the Future-in-person, foreclosed to History and determining the imagination itself, 18 that already is given before something like the order of the subject, and thus is the other name of the Heretic-Rebel. They are always right now and already In-Struggle, within a radical impossibility of belief in any such supermaster. If Laruelle employs the term City of Heretics, he specifies that it "does not take the place of mastery or install itself in the World," that "Rebellion ... does not make an oeuvre, or it is the Rebel in person that is precisely this oeuvre." 19 With the term City also employed here, despite its

semantic attractiveness, taking account of its heavy worldly hinter-plane is probably not the most adequate, for it can lead to error and let one think that non-philosophy could work and construct within and for the World; however, this is not the case. Laruelle is very clear on this point: "Thus, [utopia] completes itself within the constitution of the subject as autonomous activity, within a Utopia of Strangers or a City of Heretics which for its part is then neither of Heaven nor of Earth but simply non-philosophical practice itself."20 Otherwise, if he conjointly employs the term *Utopia of Strangers*, perhaps it is to propose another formulation that would dismiss and avoid any ambiguity; moreover, we could equally employ the expression Utopia of Heretics without an alteration of meaning.

Thus, the extraterritoriality—its deployment by way of utopia(-)power through the Rebel-Stranger, the immanent Future, ceaselessly taken back into the Un-stand [l'Un-stand]<sup>21</sup>—is the antidote to the city qua *Logopolis*, whether it

<sup>17</sup> Comm-Unauté a term that is introduced in Leseuer, Non-philosophie du sujet politique, 239. Lesueur defines it as the People-without-the-World who determine in-the-last-identity the Rebellion (of) People, which is inexplicable to Philosophy. Comm-unauty is the condition of possibility of being-together of a people who are no longer the subjugated subject of the World. It would seem that Lesueur updates with this conception Laruelle's old concept, the People or Peoples (of) the One, introduced in the fourth issue of Pourquoi pas la philosophie?, entitled "Le philosophe sans qualités," from October 1984 and A Biography of Ordinary Man. – Trans.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>18</sup> Laruelle, Struggle and Utopia, 18; 21.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>19</sup> Laruelle, Struggle and Utopia, 206; 170.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>20</sup> Laruelle, *Struggle and Utopia*, 167, translation slightly modified; 139.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>21</sup> Lesueur defines *l'Un-stand* in *Non-philosophie du sujet politique*, in the subsection, "La déterminant radicalité de l'Un-stand," 141-43. According to Lesueur, the *Un-stand* is a portmanteau between the One (*l'Un*) and the instant. Citing varying philosophies of the instant such as Zeno of Elea, Parmenides, Plato, Aristotle, Leibniz, and Bachelard, Lesueur's *Un-Stand* "(is) the instant that (is), a radical condition of a Future not determined by

is itself extraterritorial or physically territorialized. This force issued from non-philosophy seen as the style of heresy against conformity<sup>22</sup>—valuable to set an end once and for all and once each time with worldly domination—must be protected against the attacks of the Thought-World and all its avatars, notably the imaginary ones that rage without our knowledge in the windings of our thoughts. For a non-historial and non-temporal ecology of utopias, 23 it is better to not stumble by accident into the ideology of heresies. In this context, vigilance and rigor are eminently necessary (included within the employment of terms) as guarantees of a universeutopia radically distinct from world-utopias and an identification of utopia and struggle constantly regressing. In their calling as destroyers of Conformism, non-philosophers owe themselves to the most radical coherence, under penalty of becoming, without their knowledge, the pretentious servitors of the Thought-World. From this point of view, the term city, even endowed with a capital letter, appears disqualified; the banishment of its use seems to be a judicious precaution. Otherwise, if rebellion does not make up a work, as Laruelle highlights, if the imagination qua utopic worldly modelizing—another machination of reality—is also disqualified, must we then totally resolve ourselves to a non-acting that is indifferent to the worldly motion, and therefore to a sealed fate of present humans and those to come? What is a utopia that comes unilaterally into the World and does not stumble into the mirages and belief in a worldly efficiency and materialization? Without directly responding to this question—which would be to immediately return to a decisional posture—we can nevertheless liberate the conditions of possibility of a *Manifested* of this order, namely, a radically immanent emanation (of) the Real:

- (1) Remaining within the heart of the vision-in-One in a stable way regardless of the circumstances,
- (2) to never let fear (re)take control of our thoughts and effective actions and
- (3) prevent the return of the circle of Being and Having by refusing worldly determination, and therefore the definition of *Man in lack of*, reclaiming, by contrast, the Radical Identity of the Stranger for any Human without exception and thus

the hallucination of the Past as Truth" (Lesueur, Non-philosophie du sujet politique, 142). While it may be a creative concept, it is not a simple flirtation of language: the *Un-stand* "(is) of a radical exteriority in relation to any Past-Present-Future sequence, containing within it all determinations of the Past,

the Power-within-the-Real of the Present, and the entire potentialites of the *to-come* as Future" (ibid., 143).

<sup>-</sup> Trans

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>22</sup> Laruelle, Struggle and Utopia, 13; 17.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>23</sup> Laruelle, Struggle and Utopia, 14; 18.

(4) abolishing any principle of division, separation and exclusion, the nightmarish vision of the threat of barbarism, included within thought, through the In-Man according to the essential non-philosophical principle *I* and the Stranger are identical in the Last-Identity;<sup>24</sup>

(5) to extend the vision-in-One to all living ones, to the plants and animals, but also to the whole biosphere and thus open itself, from a radically immanent opening, to the condition of possibility of an *eco* (relative to the notion of the house) that no longer emerges from the norm (*-nomos, -nomie*) nor logic (*-logos, -logy*), nor a system.

These minimal conditions constitute a non-exhaustive list: there are perhaps and surely other conditions.

The guarantee of a universe-utopia (and even uni-vers-es [unis-vers]) resides within the suspension of a conception or imagination with a worldly political and/or anthropo-logical and -

centric content, as well as a mundane projection of our fears materialized [dans la matière]. Fear, the first thread of the fabric of our subjugation, one that is neither more nor less our fear of death—or the idea that we ourselves make of it—is perhaps more precisely bound to any loss or theft of identity. This is ultimately why the point is to have trust in the indirect effects of the vision-in-One and to no longer stumble back into the fear that nothing will happen and therefore in the Pretension of the seizure [saisie]; the point is to trust that the vision-in-One, qua utopia(-)power, will emerge in an ad *hoc* and solely functional and spontaneous way from the structural forms of concrete existences. Let us cultivate the vision-in-One and see what happens. Keep in mind and heart the humility of the ephemeral and the fictional, that is, the belief in this World, far from the worldly Decision and Pretension to definitive calling, because it is grounded on a proclaimed Truth. Let the Stranger-Rebel ex-ist in their Real-Liberty, which is also Un-spired [Un-spire]. 25 Trust in the Oraxiomatic Future, the always already

<sup>24</sup> François Laruelle, *Théorie des étrangers: Science des hommes, démocratie, non-psychanalyse* (Paris: Kimé, 1995), 129

function, no mission devolved or assigned to them in advance. It is a radical opening, a Presence-to-self without concern, just within the pleasure of discovering their potential of being. It is an opening to Identity as self-discovery within creativity, but still different from self-sculpture. It is an opening to an awakening as if to a smile, therefore to wonderment. It is a moment of Creation that is ceaselessly renewed, at any fraction of a second, a radical opening to Being and above all to perseverance within Being, so dear to Spinoza, and that we here retrieve in its full evocative Capacity [Puissance]. This is why the Un-Stand (is) also an Unspired (Un-Spired) creator." – Trans.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>25</sup> The term *Un-spiré* also appears in the same subsection of Lesueur's book as the *Un-stand* and is evoked as a portmanteau of the One and a subject inspired by a creative impulse. Lesueur writes in *Non-philosophie du sujet politique*, 143: "Within the Vision of the *Un-stand*, each subject can take the measure of their Being-other-than-the-subject, their Stranger-Existence and their Heretical Identity, for they envisage themselves otherwise than subordinated to: in the discovery of themselves with no configuration, no framework, no

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there, at once utopia and uchronia as the tenor of this force, unwavering and inalienable because it is radically heretical.